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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHAD BLACKARD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 12-704-SDD-RLB
LIVINGSTON PARISH SEWER DISTRICT
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment' filed by the Defendant, 
Livingston Parish Sewer District. Plaintiff, Chad Blackard, has filed an Opposition1 2 to the motion. 
For the reasons which follow, the motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a mechanic. Plaintiff contends he suffers from 
bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and ADHD, which he argues are mental disabilities protected 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).3 Plaintiff claims that on July 24, 2012, he 
submitted to his employer a letter from his doctor regarding his diagnoses and requesting an 
accommodation that he not be required to carry a pager for on-call duty during the night based on 
the effects o f his prescription medication. The Defendant contends that, following notice of 
Plaintiffs mental conditions, an accommodation was provided so that the Plaintiff no longer had to
1 Rec. Doc, No, 12.
2 Rec. Doc. No. 16.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 etseq.
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work at night.4 Plaintiff claims no accommodation was ever made, and that he was terminated three 
days after his request for accommodation on July 27, 2012. Plaintiff filed this suit under Title II of 
the ADA and Section 504 o f the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973,5 arguing he has been discriminated 
against on the basis o f his disabilities and also that he was subjected to retaliatory termination for 
requesting an accommodation.
The Defendant moves for summary judgment arguing that the Plaintiff is not “disabled” for 
purposes of the ADA, that it granted a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff by removing him from 
on-call night duty, and that it terminated Plaintiff solely for his continual absenteeism and tardiness 
and without any connection to an alleged disability.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the 
affidavits, if  any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."6 The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language 
of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry o f summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."7
4 Rec. Doc. No. 5, f  7.
5 29 U.S.C. § 794 etseq.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); New York Life Ins. Co. v, Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir, 1996); Rogers v. hit'} 
Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1996).
7 CelotexCorp. v. Catrett, A l l  U.S. 317,322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also Gunacav. Texas, 
65 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1995).
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A party moving for summaiy judgment "must 'demonstrate the absence o f a genuine issue of material 
fact,’ but need not negate the elements o f the nonmovant's case."8 If the moving party "fails to meet 
this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless o f the nonmovant’s response."9
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56 (c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the 
pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other 
admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial.10 The 
nonmovanfs burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, 
metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.11 Factual controversies are to be 
resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both 
parties have submitted evidence o f contradictory facts."12 The Court will not, "in the absence of any 
proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."13 Unless there 
is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovanfs favor, there is no genuine issue 
for trial.14 *
8 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F .3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir, 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, A ll  U.S. at 323-25,I06S.Ct. 
at 2552).
9 Id. at 1075.
10 Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996).
11 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047.
12 Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). See also S. W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 12 F.3d 489, 
494 (5th Cir. 1996).
13 McCallum Highlands v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1995), as revised on denial o f
rehearing, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995).
™Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A l l  U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
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B. ADA Discrimination
The ADA “prohibits an employer from discriminating against ‘an individual with a disability’ 
who with ‘reasonable accommodation’ can perform a job’s essential function...”15 To establish a 
primafacie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was “disabled”; 
(2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) the defendant subjected him to an adverse employment 
decision because of his disability.16 If this burden is met, the burden shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision.17 Once the employer proffers such 
a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason was merely a pretext for 
discrimination.18
1. Was Plaintiff Disabled?
To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first 
establish that he has a disability.19 The term “disability” encompasses the following: (1) a mental 
or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual, (2) 
a record of such impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such impairment.20 To survive 
summary judgment, “a plaintiff must prove a substantial limit with specific evidence that his
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). 
,6 See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2006).
17 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Mclnnis v. Alamo County Coll. Dish, 207 F.3d 276,279-80 (5th 
Cir. 2000).
18 Mclnnis, 207 F.3d at 280.
19 See Bridges v. City o f  Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997); Sherrod v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5,h Cir. 1998).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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particular impairment substantially limits his particular major life activity.”21 Thus, an analysis of 
whether a plaintiff suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA requires three inquiries: 
(1) whether he suffered from a physical or mental impairment; (2) whether the physical or mental 
impairment limited any major life activity; and (3) whether the limitation was substantial.22 These 
questions must be determined on an individualized, case-by-case basis,2-5 
a. Physical or Mental Impairment
In determining whether an impairment should be classified as a covered disability, the ADA 
implementing legislation provides factors to consider, including: (1) the nature and severity of the 
impairment; (2) the duration of the impairment; and (3) the long-term impact of the impairment.24 
Plaintiff contends that he suffers from bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and ADM A, which are 
mental impairments as contemplated by the law. Emotional or mental illness can be a “mental 
impairment.”25 It is undisputed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with, and is being treated for, these 
conditions. It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs nurse practitioner testified that Plaintiff was not 
“disabled” and that Plaintiff could work with the only restriction that he not drive after taking 
Klonopin.26 Plaintiff himself also testified that he has never been diagnosed with a “mental
2t Wat dr ip v. GEi 325 F.3d 652, 656 (5lii Cir. 2003)(emphasis in original),
22 Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 242 F,3d 610. 613 (5,h Cir. 2001 foiling Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
630-631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998)).
2j See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v, Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)($u per ceded in part by statute).
2,1 Aguillardv. Mukasey, 295 F. App’x 619, 622 (5,h Cir. 2008)(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20X2).
25 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)(2).
26 Rec. Doc. No. 12-8, pp. 21-22.
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disability” by any doctor.27 Thus, the Court must determine if Plaintiffs mental impairments 
substantially limit a major life activity.
b. Impairment of a Major Life Activity & Substantial Limitation
“In order to show an impairment that ‘substantially limits a major life activity,’ the plaintiff, 
‘must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that 
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.’”28 The term “major life activities” means 
“functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working.”29 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held that sleeping is a major 
life activity.30 The ADA requires the impairment to be substantial: “An impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity if it makes an individual completely unable to perform the activity or if 
it ‘significantly restricts the duration, manner, or condition under which an individual can perform 
a particular major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population’s ability 
to perform that same major life activity.’”31
Plaintiff contends his mental impairments substantially limit the major life activities of 
sleeping and working. To establish a substantial limit in the major life activity of sleeping, a plaintiff 
“must present evidence, beyond vague assertions o f a rough night’s sleep or a need for medication,
27 Rec. Doc. No. 12-7, p. 30.
28 Carter v. Ridge, 255 F. App’x 826, 829, 2007 WL 4104349, *3 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197).
29 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
30 EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., L.P., 570 F,3d 606, 616 (5th Cir. 2009).
31 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
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that his affliction is worse than that suffered by a large portion of the nation’s adult population.”32 
Although Plaintiff contends that his mental impairments substantially limit his major life 
activity of sleeping, he provides no evidence or discussion of his own sleep patterns and how they 
compare to the average person. He simply alludes to a sleeping problem as the reason for his 
repeated tardiness at work. The record is devoid of any mention of Plaintiff s sleep limitation other 
than to acknowledge that the medicine he takes for his mental conditions make him sleepy and 
apparently causes him to oversleep. This is insufficient under the law and jurisprudence to establish 
that Plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping.
The record likewise fails to support Plaintiffs claim that he is substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working. Plaintiff argues that “[ejarly work hours and the mandatory 
requirement to be on a rotation to be on call at n igh t... would knock Plaintiff out of any jobs having 
a potentially irregular schedule or significant overtime.”33 Plaintiff contends he is significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes 
based on his inability to work night shifts or be on call. The Fifth Circuit has addressed similar 
arguments and found them without merit.
In Curl v. United Supermarkets, Ltd., the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor
32 Carter, 255 F. App’x at 830, quoting Master v. Harvey, 2007 WL 2404705, at *5-6(11th Cir. Aug. 27,2007); Pedroza 
v. Autozone, 536 F.Supp.2d 679, 696 (W.D. Tex. 2008)(the inability to enjoy more than three or four hours of 
uninterrupted sleep does not qualify as a substantial limitation); see also, Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916,919 (7th Cir. 
2006)(“intermittent disrupted sleep” is not a substantial limitation); Swanson v. Univ. o f Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307,316- 
17 (6th Cir. 2001 )(sleeping only four to five hours per night was not a substantial limitation and stating, “[w]hile less than 
five hours sleep is not optimal, it is not significantly restricted in comparison to the average person in the general 
population.”); Packv. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300,1306 (10th Cir. 1999)(plaintiff s depression-related sleep difficulties, 
limiting her to two or three hours of sleep some nights, was not a substantial limitation).
33 Rec. Doc. No. 16, p. 5.
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of an employer where the plaintiff-employee sued for discrimination under the ADA,34 The plaintiff
had claimed he was disabled due to his bipolar disorder, which he argued substantially limited him
in the major life activities of sleeping, concentrating, interacting with crowds of people, thinking,
and hearing.35 The court held that Curbs “primary evidence consists o f bald assertions based on
textbook explications of the types o f symptoms people with his impairment might experience, failing
to show Curbs own symptoms - his own ‘own experience' of substantial limitation.”36 Curl had also
argued that his impairment substantially limited the major life activity o f working because he could
not work night shifts. The court rejected this argument as well, stating:
He points only to Department of Labor statistics showing that over four million 
positions in various industries involve night shifts, allegedly showing he is “unable 
to perform a broad range o f jobs in numerous industries.” Not only are these 
statistics too broad because not limited to Curbs specific geographic area or people 
within “comparable training, skills, or abilities,” but Curbs inability to perform ajob 
at certain times - as opposed to an inability to perform the job in general - is an 
insufficient “inability to perform one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to 
perform the work in general,.,”37 Indeed, Curl concedes that he could perform the 
work of a doughnut fryer during the day and that he held daytime bakery and sales 
positions after leaving United, Curl was not unable to work a “broad range of jobs 
in various classes,” he was only unable to work any job at a range of times.38 39
A similar decision was reached in Carter v. Ridge?9 In Carter, the plaintiff was a pilot
34 No. 05-10316, 179 Fed. Appx. 208, 2006 WL 1096696 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2006).
35 Id  at 209.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2 10, citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F. 3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995)(hoiding that plaintiffs inability to 
perform welding job requiring climbing due to her injured arm because she could work as a welder in general).
38 Id. (emphasis added),
39 No. 07-20275, 255 F. App’x 826, 2007 WL 4104349 (5,h Cir. Nov. 19, 2007).
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employed by the Department o f Homeland Security who argued that he was an individual with a 
disability because his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) substantially limited his major life 
activities of sleeping and working.40 The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the 
employer, finding that Carter was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working 
simply because he could not pilot single engine piston driven aircraft but could operate other types 
o f aircraft.41 The court also rejected Carter’s argument that he was substantially limited in the major 
life activity of sleeping. Carter’s physician had testified that Carter was experiencing some sleep 
disturbance making him tired, fatigued, and uncomfortable. The physician classified “sleep 
disturbance” as “less than normal sleep” and noted that Carter was getting less than five hours of 
sleep a night. The Court held that “Carter’s sleep was limited by his PTSD, but [the evidence] did 
not establish that he was substantially impaired in the major life activity o f sleeping. Thus, the 
district court correctly found that Carter had not presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue 
o f material fact as to whether his PTSD substantially limited his major life activity of sleeping.”42 
The jurisprudence and the facts o f this case clearly support a finding that the Plaintiff suffers 
mental impairments, but these impairments do not substantially limit his major life activities of 
sleeping and working. As such, the Plaintiff is not “disabled” for purposes o f the ADA.43
40 Id  at 829.
4’ Id: at 830.
42 Id., citing Nuzumv, Ozark Auto Distribs,, 432 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005)(fmding that sleeping two and a half hours 
at a time and five hours a night is not substantially impaired).
43 Because the Court has ruled that Plaintiff is not an individual with a disability under the ADA, which is the first 
requirement to establish a prima facie  case for a denial of reasonable accommodation claim, the Court also grants 
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on this claim.
Doc 324 9
2. Was Plaintiff Qualified for the Job?
Curiously, neither party actually addresses the nature of Plaintiffs job as a mechanic or the 
specific job duties he is required to perform. As such, the Court cannot determine on the current 
record if  Plaintiff was, in fact, qualified for the position he held. However, because the Court has 
already found that Plaintiff is not “disabled” under the ADA, this analysis is unnecessary. The Court 
finds that summary judgment is proper in favor of the Defendant on the ADA discrimination claim,
C. Retaliation under the ADA
Plaintiff also claims that he was terminated three days after having requested a reasonable 
accommodation for his alleged disability in violation of the ADA, To establish a prima facie case 
o f unlawful retaliation, plaintiff must show that he: (1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) suffered 
an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the activity and the 
action.44 If a plaintiff can establish these factors, the burden shifts to the Defendant to provide a 
legitimate, non-di scrim inatory reason for taking the adverse action.45 If provided, the plaintiff “must 
adduce sufficient evidence that the proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation.”46 Further, plaintiff 
must show that, “but for” the protected activity, the adverse employment action would not have 
occurred.47
In this case, Plaintiff has clearly established a prima facie case of retaliation. Plaintiff
44 Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F,3d 297, 301 (5lh Cir. 1999).
45Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. The Plaintiff is incorrect that a “but for” standard is not required for this claim. University o f  Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, — U.S. — , 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013).
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engaged in protected activity by requesting a reasonable accommodation, suffered an adverse 
employment action by being terminated, and the temporal proximity between these actions 
establishes a causal connection on its face. However, the Defendant has provided a legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termination. The record establishes that Plaintiff had a long 
history of absenteeism and tardiness. Plaintiff attempts to explain away these problems, stating that 
“a portion of these days ... are because he had an injury at work, for the death of his father, and 
regarding sleep problems caused by drowsiness caused by his medicine and/or mental 
impairments.”48 Plaintiff also cites the testimony of his nurse practitioner that someone with sleeping 
problems and depression might be late for work on occasion.49 Plaintiff further argues that, based 
on the calendar submitted by the Defendant, several other employees called in sick and left early for 
doctor’s appointments on multiple occasions, which he contends is further evidence of pretext.
Plaintiff s arguments are without merit and unsupported by the record. First, the Court notes 
that Plaintiffs well-documented tardiness and excessive absenteeism long pre-date his notice to the 
Defendant o f his alleged disability and request for accommodation. The record reflects that Plaintiff 
was placed on probation for these problems on July 12, 2012, and that Plaintiff continued to be late 
for work or sometimes not show at all. It is clear that the Defendant placed Plaintiff on probation 
for these problems prior to having any notice o f his alleged disabilities. Further, on July 27, 2012, 
Plaintiff failed to show up for work at all, and has completely failed to address this aspect of his 
termination.
1,8 Rec. Doc. No. 16, p. 15.
49 Id., citing Rec. Doc. No. 12-8, pp. 39-40.
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The Court is also unpersuaded that other employees were treated more favorably with regard
to sick leave based on Plaintiffs “calendar” evidence. Plaintiffs employment records show that he
had taken more than 109 hours of sick leave before July 27,2012, despite the fact that the Defendant
only allows an employee 80 hours of sick leave in an entire year. Plaintiff offers no evidence that
the other employees with whom he compared himself had so vastly exceeded the allowable sick days
for the year, or that they also were on probation for habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
The Carter case discussed above also involved a claim of retaliation.50 The court found that
the defendant had offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Carter’s termination in that he
refused to accept his directed reassignment. Carter argued he had shown pretext for this decision
by showing that other pilots were permitted to fly only one type of aircraft and he was not.51 The
Fifth Circuit stated, “[i]t is true that a plaintiff may establish pretext by demonstrating that, under
similar circumstances, other employees who had not engaged in protected activity were treated
differently.”52 However, the court continued:
[T]he Agency does not assert that Carter was removed because he was unable to fly 
two types o f aircraft; they claim he was removed because o f his refusal to accept the 
directed reassignment. Therefore, to show pretext here based on dissimilar treatment,
Carter would have to show that other employees who had refused a directed 
reassignment were not terminated. Carter’s argument that other pilots were 
permitted to fly only one type of plane and he was not -  would only be relevant to a 
claim that the underlying directed reassignment based on his inability to fly two 
planes was retaliatory. He has presented no evidence that the Agency’s reason for 
the removal itself was retaliatory. The district court’s grant of summary judgment
50 Carter, 255 F. App’x 826.
51 Id. at 831-32.
52 Id. at 832, citing McCoy v. City o f  Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 562 (5,h Cir. 2007).
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was proper.53
Similarly, in Conner v. Louisiana Department o f Health and Hospitals, the plaintiff sued her
former employer for retaliation under the ADA.54 The defendant had terminated Conner for her
absenteeism, but Conner alleged that her termination was retaliation for claiming disability
discrimination. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that absenteeism was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Conner’s termination for which she could not offer evidence of pretext.55
Likewise, in Sanchez v. United States Postal Service, a former postal employee sued the Post
Office for retaliation under the ADA and other statutes,56 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Post Office, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed as follows:
Even assuming arguendo that Sanchez has established a prima facie case, his 
retaliation claim still fails. The USPS has set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for firing Sanchez: Sanchez’s 301 hours of unscheduled sick leave. Sanchez 
admits he had “absenteeism issues” and only submitted documentation for less than 
half of his absences. He argues instead, that the temporal proximity between his 
firing and his EEO complaint supports his claim. That is not sufficient to create a 
material issue of pretext. As this court has held, “temporal proximity alone is 
insufficient to prove but for causation.”57
Applying the law and jurisprudence to the facts of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 
failed to present evidence of pretext for the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given for his
53 Id.
54 No. 12-31254, — F, App’x —, 2013 WL 3306355 (5,hCir. July 1,2013).
^  Id  at *3.
56 No. 10-20512, 430 F.App’x 368, 201 1 WL 2505084 (5th Cir. June 23, 2011).
57 Id  at 371, quoting Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC., 482 F.3d 808 (5lh Cir. 2007).
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termination. Thus, summary judgment is proper in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiffs retaliation 
claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant 
Livingston Parish Sewer District58 is granted. Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BATON ROUGE, Louisiana, this /  '2 -  day of September, 2013.
/SHELLY D. DICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
58 Rec. Doc. No. 12.
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